To many readers, the topic of sanctions is probably deathly boring, and odds are, given the negative press around the topic, you might think those sanction regimes are ineffective (if you think of them at all). It’s true that Russia has managed to evade sanctions left and right, routing European and American microelectronics through partners like China and Kazakhstan to evade the sanctions regimes that have been the West’s primary method for direct action against Russian aggression.
As per the Economist, sanctions have been “as watertight as a sieve”, with sanctions enforcement looking more like a reactionary game of whack-a-mole to many than the resolute defence of democracy was envisioned. The truth of the matter, as with most things geopolitical, is a far more complex matter than can be adequately expressed in this article. However, it boils down to this: the sanctions are working pretty well. And here’s why:
Microelectronics exports from Kazakhstan into Russia exploded in February 2022, at the dawn of the latest chapter of Russia’s war against Ukraine, which began in 2014 with the annexation of Crimea. Jumping from a mere $65,500 the month before the invasion, these exports to Russia rose to almost $820,000 within a month. The flip side of this sanction evasion isn’t talked about all that often, which is how expensive this makes the microelectronics that make up the foundation of any war machine. Semiconductors and other microelectronics are needed in everything from planes to missiles to tanks, all of which are now much more expensive to produce in the quantities needed.
Thanks to these rising prices, Russia has had to shift its resources away from the pillars of a modern military superpower, and into efforts to barely scrape by in their war. Planes in major air bases are left to rot due to an inability to source the needed supplies, while the resources are divvied up into fueling unsustainable losses on the battlefield.
The static state of these craft serves as a damning indictment of the Russian Federation’s inability to source the basics that underpin a developed military. Battlefield losses have remained at an unsustainable rate, with defence procurement acquiring fewer vehicles than attrition claims. Platforms like artillery, drones, and armored vehicles have been prioritised for repair and procurement, leaving aircraft to fall into disrepair.
To further witness the evidence of sanctions’ effect, one need look no further than their weapons imports. As many readers are no doubt aware, North Korea has sent around ten thousand troops (estimates vary) to Russia, along with rockets and millions of artillery shells (of questionable quality, to put it lightly). A self-proclaimed military superpower must be in dire straits indeed if they’re forced to buy shells that, reportedly, often fail to leave the barrel of the artillery piece.
Iran has played a major role as well, supplying their ally with the now-infamous Shahed cruise missile, rockets, and Mohajer-6 drones. In exchange, it appears that Russia has given Viktor Bout (the arms dealer freed in the prisoner exchange for Brittney Griner) their blessings to sell arms to the Houthi rebel group, an Iranian proxy and designated terror organisation. In the long run, and perhaps more concerningly for NATO and its allies, these weapons deliveries are likely being used as a trial run to test the systems’ efficacy against Western-made arms. Pariah states like Iran and North Korea are not alone in their material aid either; China appears to have lent their Russian partners a hand.
But Iran and North Korea aren’t Russia’s only supporters. China also seems to be quietly stepping in. Despite their denials of weapons transfers, evidence suggests Chinese-made counter-drone weapons are in use by Russian forces. Images from the recent fall of the Assad regime show Russian special forces using equipment manufactured by LoongUAV capable of jamming drones up to 1.5 kilometers away. Russia’s need to source their modern technology from other countries, with no evidence that they are producing high-quality analogues themselves, should tell you how much the sanctions are biting.
Even with foreign aid, there is a significant gap between the military’s needs and actual procurement. This can be best illustrated by Russia’s announcement that they would be halting production of the Su-57, citing an inability to acquire the parts needed to maintain the aircraft. Instead, they will be focusing on older platforms like the Su-35. The impressions of inadequate production are compounded by the Kremlin’s announcement that the state-owned film studio Mosfilm would transfer ownership of their T-55 and PT-76 tanks (which were first manufactured in the 1950s) further highlighting the gap between Russia’s needs and production capability caused by sanctions.
This is part of a wider trend of Russian prioritisation of armored vehicles, artillery, and UAVs over manned aircraft. Their inability to source sufficient parts for repair, coupled with the ever-looming threat of Ukraine’s missiles, has forced Russia to effectively abandon traditional air dominance. Despite the Russian Ministry of Defence’s emphasis on armor and artillery, data suggests that there is still a ~15% gap between the rates of repair and manufactured units and their subsequent losses on the battlefield. Sanctions have ensured that the high attrition rates inflicted by Ukraine’s forces are unsustainable for Russia.
To be clear, sanctions and Western aid can and should go further, but this look into sanctions regimes’ impacts should dispel any doubts about their efficacy. There is now no credibility behind assertions that Russia can be called a modern military superpower; their reduced capabilities are compensated for only through human wave tactics and brutish threats.
